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In Liberalism’s Religion, Cécile Laborde defends a theory of liberal sec-
ularism that is compatible with a minimal separation of religion and 
politics. According to her view, liberal state—she calls it Divinitia—that 
symbolically establishes the historic majority’s religious doctrine and in-
spires some of its legislation on a conservative interpretation of such re-
ligious tradition can be legitimate. In this article I analyse how is it like 
to belong to the minority of liberal progressive citizens in a country like 
Divinitia. I argue that their political activism will be defeated by Divini-
tia’s status quo on at least four different grounds. First, in virtue of being 
a minority, liberal progressive citizens would rarely obtain democratic 
victories; second, the conservative majority could rightly argue that they 
do not have reasons to compromise their views in order to accommodate 
progressives’; third, the conservative majority can rightly complain that 
counter-majoritarian initiatives advanced by progressives are unfair; 
and four, Divinitia’s public reason reproduces an asymmetry, for reli-
giously inspired reasons can be accessible and therefore justifi catory in 
politics, while the reasons progressives would desire to present in public 
deliberation would not be accessible to their conservative fellow citizens.
Keywords: Secularism, religion, church-state separation, liberal-
ism, conservative majorities.
In June 2018, the lower house of Argentinian congress approved a bill 
proposing to legalize abortion in the fi rst fourteen weeks of pregnancy. 
The bill was passed by 129 to 125 votes and set for discussion in the up-
per house on August 8. Massive demonstrations of support took place, 
attiring international attention and praise. On August 8, Amnesty In-
ternational published in The New York Times a full-page message to 
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Argentinian congress: “The World is Watching.” The women’s move-
ment of several Latin American countries organized mobilizations of 
support to their Argentinian allies.
The bill was also strongly resisted, with the Catholic Church in the 
frontline of opposition. British newspaper The Guardian reported that 
Pope Francis I—or Jorge Mario Bergoglio, former archbishop of Argen-
tina’s capital, Buenos Aires—personally requested anti-abortion sena-
tors to lobby against the bill. Under Francis I, the Catholic Church has 
not modifi ed its complete opposition to abortion. The Pope’s words on it 
are suffi ciently telling, as The Guardian reports:
speaking at a meeting of an Italian family association, [the Pope] said: “Last 
century, the whole world was scandalised by what the Nazis did to purify 
the race. Today, we do the same thing but with white gloves.”1
Priests, cardinals, and bishops actively opposed the bill in their sermons. 
While Congress was deliberating, a “mass for life” took place at the ca-
thedral of Buenos Aires. The upper house voted 38 against the bill to 31 
in favour of it. On August 9, 2018, newspapers in Argentina and else-
where reported the defeat of the bill as a victory of the Catholic Church.
In Argentina, a largely Catholic country, abortion is allowed only 
in cases of rape and when the mother’s health is in danger. Although 
some interpreted the result as a victory—after all, it won a majority 
in the lower house—there is discontent among progressive Argentin-
ian citizens that their moral views on this particular issue cannot be 
decisive in political decisions. Once again, the Catholic Church showed 
its political muscle in Latin America, a region that counts with nearly 
40% of the world’s Catholic population and which, for the fi rst time, is 
the birthplace of the Pope. Progressives in Argentina complain that the 
Catholic Church has too much infl uence and power in their country, 
which to their eyes is a contradiction to Argentina’s public commitment 
to protecting liberal and democratic principles, which includes the in-
stitutional separation of church and state.
Are progressive citizens of Argentina justifi ed in feeling politically 
frustrated? Is it legitimate that a historically hegemonic conserva-
tive religious tradition inspires legislation and shapes how the pub-
lic sphere looks like? Cécile Laborde’s defence of ‘minimal secularism’ 
in Liberalism’s Religion (2017) offers important insights for address-
ing these sort of questions, as she argues that liberal conceptions of 
justice—to which the Argentinian state claims to be committed—are 
compatible with legislations that are inspired by conservative interpre-
tations of religious doctrines. Contrary to the feeling of many Argentin-
ian women demonstrating on August 8, the ratifi ed restrictive law on 
abortion might be legitimate within a liberal state (and therefore not 
blatantly unjust), even if it is the case that it is inspired by a conserva-
tive interpretation of a religious doctrine.
1 Sherwood, Harriet, “Argentina abortion defeat shows enduring power of the 
Catholic Church,” The Guardian, August 9, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/aug/09/argentina-abortion-defeat-shows-enduring-power-of-catholic-
church
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Progressives, both in the academic world and in society’s public 
sphere, might be tempted to resist Laborde’s position. After all, they 
believe their political views, although susceptible to reasonable disa-
greement, promote justice. According to them, their political opponents 
hold views that do not promote justice. Progressives are, therefore, in 
an unstable position: a common criticism in the informal public sphere 
directed against liberal progressive citizens is that they claim to be 
proud defenders of toleration and of the promotion and protection of di-
versity; but that when faced to practices, doctrines, attitudes, or beliefs 
that depart from their liberal progressive convictions, they abandon 
their commitments to toleration and diversity. Progressive Argentin-
ians, the criticism could go, are committed to toleration and diversity 
only if abortion is not criminalized, otherwise they would not consider 
the restrictive legislation as just and those who defend it as reasonable. 
In political philosophy the charge also appears. Liberal egalitarians are 
criticized for having ‘a tendency to frame their preferred progressive 
conception of justice as the only acceptable conception of justice, and to 
dismiss dissenters as unreasonable’ (Laborde 2017: 158).2
Laborde argues that the minimal requirements of secularism in a lib-
eral state allow for a wider range of relationships between religion and 
politics than liberals, or progressives,3 usually are willing to accept. In 
particular, she argues that religiously conservative states can be legiti-
mate according to liberal standards of justice. Consequently, she argues 
that progressives should be willing to accept that, in addition to their 
preferred ideal worlds of progressive legislation, conservative countries 
that establish religion and approve legislation in accordance with a con-
servative interpretation of such religion can also be legitimate.
Laborde illustrates the case for a legitimate religiously conservative 
state by describing the (fi ctitious) country of Divinitia. This is a state 
that symbolically recognizes religion; fi nds inspiration in a religious 
tradition in the justifi cation of some of its laws, restricts abortion, eu-
thanasia, and ‘other practices in bioethics;’ provides for religious educa-
tion within the school system; grants rights of collective autonomy to 
religious groups in the name of freedom of association; and recognizes 
‘numerous exceptions and accommodations for religiously motivated be-
haviour’ (Laborde 2017: 151–52). The legitimacy of Divinitia depends 
on whether the institutional relationship between the state and religion 
meets the three criteria of what Laborde calls ‘minimal secularism’:
      a) ‘when a [religious] reason is not generally accessible, it should 
not be appealed to by state offi cials to justify state coercion;’
      b)  ‘when a social identity [for instance, a religious identity] is a 
marker of vulnerability and domination, it should not be sym-
bolically endorsed and promoted by the state;’ and
      c) ‘when a practice relates to a comprehensive ethics, it should not 
be coercively enforced on individuals’ (Laborde 2017: 150).
2 Here Laborde is paraphrasing Gerald Gaus (2012).
3 I will henceforth use the terms ‘liberals’ and ‘progressives’ indistinctively.
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The legitimacy of Divinitia situates its progressive citizens in an un-
fortunate position. They subjectively consider that certain laws and 
institutional arrangements of their country are unjust, yet they are 
required to recognize that they are objectively legitimate. Subjective 
injustice refers to the reasoned judgment of the citizen that x is unjust. 
In contrast, y is legitimate in virtue of its being justifi ed according to 
principles are reasonable for all citizens to endorse (in this case, ac-
cording to conditions a, b, and c of minimal secularism). Progressive 
citizens might still rightly complain that their views are not adequately 
taken into consideration and therefore that, even if legislation meets 
conditions a, b, and c, they have reasons not to accept the legislation of 
Divinitia. Laborde acknowledges this problem, and for this reason adds 
a fourth condition d for the legitimacy of Divinitia. It is a procedural 
one; it sets a standard of democratic fairness that consists in the inclu-
sion of minorities ‘within fair and inclusive process of democratic delib-
eration’ (Laborde 2017: 156). If these conditions are met, a progressive 
citizen of Divinitia would have to put up to her bad luck of being born in 
a country she fi nds unjust—and, in cases like the Argentinian legisla-
tion about abortion, profoundly unjust.
The purpose of this article is to investigate what is it like to be a 
progressive citizen in Divinitia. I am interested in analysing how bur-
densome would it be for a progressive to live in a country that fi nds in-
spiration for some of its laws in conservative interpretations of religion. 
More specifi cally, I am interested in analysing the prima facie valid-
ity of transformative political activism that results from the subjective 
conviction of injustice. I argue that transformative political activism by 
progressive citizens is not prima facie valid once the legitimacy of Di-
vinitia is accepted. In other words, the views progressives would wish 
to advance as reactions to their rejection of religious conservatism are 
rightly defeated by the conservative justifi cations of the laws of Divini-
tia. If it is conceded that Divinitia is suffi ciently conservative as to trig-
ger progressive citizens to engage in politics, then Laborde’s account of 
minimal secularism reproduces a status quo bias. The reason for this 
is that conditions upon which it would be adequate for a progressive to 
seek reform in the religiously-conservative tenets of Divinitia’s public 
sphere are very limited.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this argument is that the 
liberalism defended by Laborde is better suited to accommodate moder-
ate reformism rather than progressive’s radical counter-majoritarian 
political activism. This is not intended to be a criticism of Laborde’s 
general account of liberalism. It is only an attempt to make explicit 
that the underlying understanding of liberalism that Laborde is pre-
senting is in relative tension with what might be some core elements in 
the way some progressive citizens and movements—perhaps including 
some variants of the feminist movement—consider their main political 
motivations.
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1. On how conservative is Divinitia
Although Laborde claims that a country that fi nds inspiration for some 
of its legislation in a conservative interpretation of a religious doctrine 
can be legitimate according to a standard conception of justice, she does 
not make explicit references as to how conservative such legislation 
can be. She says, for instance, that in Divinitia ‘there are restrictive 
laws about abortion’ (Laborde 2017: 151), yet she does not specify how 
restrictive these laws can be. She also suggests that the establishment 
of the Anglican Church in Great Britain could be understood as confer-
ring Britain some of the features of Divinitia, yet she stresses that Brit-
ish legislation about abortion and same-sex marriage is far from being 
conservative—with the exception of Northern Ireland (Laborde 2017: 
153). How conservative can Divinitia be?
Religious conservatism in many western democracies is salient in 
issues that are directly and indirectly related to regulations of sexual-
ity and sexual behaviour. Thus, a conservative interpretation of the 
religious doctrine of the majority might inspire legislation on abortion, 
family law, education about sexuality in elementary school, and the 
defi nition of the family as heteronomous and monogamous. In recent 
years, governmental initiatives of mandatory HPV vaccination re-
ceived vigorous opposition by both vaccination sceptics and religiously 
conservative groups, the latter most probably because of the fact that 
HPV is a sexually transmitted disease.4 What are the limits that these 
legislations must observe in Divinitia? An immediate constraint to Di-
vinitia’s legislation is that its basic structure is regulated by a liberal 
conception of justice. This means that it is committed to protecting the 
core set of basic liberal rights such as freedom of conscience, freedom 
of association, equality before the law, rule of law and equal political 
rights. Divinitia is conservative, but within the limits of liberalism. 
What are these? A couple of examples can help to illustrate.
Opposition to same-sex marriage is one of the typical positions that 
conservative religions uphold in western democracies. Can Divini-
tia have a conservative religiously inspired regulation on marriage? 
Considering that Divinitia endorses a liberal conception of justice, its 
regulations on marriage cannot go against the idea of citizens as free 
and equal. For instance, there would not be a ban on homosexual rela-
tionships, even if some conservative interpretations of the Bible would 
suggest otherwise. If what is at stake is free and equal citizenship, 
conservative religion cannot inform legislation.
Yet not all of conservative religion on issues of same sex legislation 
interferes with free and equal citizenship. Legislation on same sex mar-
riage can be taken to the symbolic realm. Some religiously inspired op-
ponents to state’s recognition of same-sex marriage argue that ‘mar-
4 Grimes, David Robert, “We know it’s effective. So why is there opposition to 
the HPV vaccine?”, The Guardian, January 11, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
science/blog/2016/jan/11/why-is-there-opposition-hpv-vaccine-cervical-cancer
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riage’ is by defi nition the union of a man and a woman, and that calling 
‘marriage’ any other form of union (a same sex couple, for instance) is 
a conceptual impossibility. This form of opposing to same sex marriage 
can be accompanied with the proposal to recognize civil partnership for 
same sex couples. Thus, same sex unions would be recognized by the 
state, yet they should not be called—and registered—as marriages. In 
practice, a same sex union would receive the same rights than a mar-
riage receives, yet they would be named differently.5 The inequality that 
is institutionalized is only symbolic. Can this be a feature of Divinitia?
One immediate response would point that this is not a mere symbol-
ic unequal recognition, for it entails discriminatory behaviour against 
those who are in ‘civil unions.’ Non-recognition of same sex (amorous) 
relationships as marriage creates an unnecessary instance in which 
LGBTI members are obliged to disclose a source of discrimination 
against them. This can happen, for instance, at the moment of fi lling 
out registration forms that ask about marital status. This does not af-
fect all equally, but creates situations in which unwanted release of 
information becomes mandatory and disadvantageous for members of 
a group that is already in condition of vulnerability. This argument 
against unequal symbolic recognition shows that the inequality at 
stake is not entirely symbolic, for it triggers discriminatory behaviour. 
Therefore, its legitimacy might be contested in virtue of making more 
salient vulnerable social identities (condition b of minimal secularism).
It is possible to think of a case in which this discriminatory behav-
iour is not triggered and therefore unequal symbolic recognition re-
mains entirely symbolic. Let’s assume that society in Divinitia does 
not discriminate against homosexuals, yet it still defends the unequal 
symbolic recognition—in virtue of a conservative interpretation of a re-
ligious doctrine. Under this assumption, unequal recognition remains 
entirely symbolic as same sex unions and marriage unions would be 
granted equal rights and no social discrimination would occur against 
individuals who constitute the former kind of union.6 Following the cri-
teria of minimal secularism, in this case unequal symbolic recognition 
is legitimate if the justifi cation provided for this unequal symbolic rec-
ognition is advanced in accessible public reasons (for instance, on the 
etymology of the word ‘marriage,’ on its traditional and historic mean-
ing); if it does not deepen social vulnerabilities (that is, that it does 
not harm LGTBI members in any sense similar to the one described 
above); if it does not entail that all citizens must accept the truth of a 
religious doctrine (the regulation is inspired by the religious doctrine, 
yet it does not impose it); and if fair democratic procedures are ob-
5 Notice that, in this example, civil unions would recognize the right to adopt 
children to same sex couples. Religiously conservatives are usually against such a 
recognition.
6 For a critical analysis of whether purely religious reasons for opposing same 
sex marriage can be accepted by Laborde’s conception of public reason, see (Bardon 
2018).
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served in the process of its approval. Under these conditions, this form 
of differentiated recognition can be legitimate. Since disagreement is a 
permanent condition of democratic regimes, it is normal to assume that 
there will be reasonable citizens that would deeply disagree with regu-
lation of this sort. They might indeed fi nd it offensive and unjust, and 
they might have good reasons to support their beliefs. These citizens 
must however recognize the legitimacy of the regulation and accept its 
authoritative status.
The second case is abortion. In Divinitia, Laborde says, there will 
be restrictive laws about it. How restrictive these laws can be? This is 
a harder question to address because disagreements about the permis-
sibility of abortion are often described as an illustration of a debate 
that leads to reasonable disagreements. In a reasonable disagreement, 
both parties are epistemically justifi ed in their beliefs, even if these 
lead to opposite conclusions. Reasonable disagreements are originated 
by cultural, epistemic, and idiosyncratic reasons—among others. They 
are particularly challenging in politics because of the urgent need to 
make decisions, and in cases of reasonable disagreements some sac-
rifi ce needs to be done. If a particular issue is a case of reasonable 
disagreement, and if conditions a, b, and c, are observed, then it seems 
that the legitimacy of the regulation to be approved would depend on 
the democratic fairness of the decision. Here democratic majorities are 
advantaged and therefore a conservative or restrictive legislation—in 
the case of abortion—would be approved. But how conservative—or re-
strictive—this legislation can be? What are the limits set by liberal 
justice in this specifi c issue?
A typical conservative (and religiously conservative) argument 
against abortion appeals to the value of protecting (innocent) human 
lives from being killed. As such, this is a reason that any reasonable 
person is expected to accept. The source of the disagreement in de-
bates about abortion lies in the diffi culty to determine whether abor-
tion involves ‘killing innocent human lives.’ Here the debate turns into 
a question about the beginning of human life, and on this issue there is 
opacity: at some point in pregnancy the foetus turns into a human be-
ing. This opacity makes the conservative argument a potentially valid 
one—although not necessarily an unbeatable one. As long as this spe-
cifi c question is not answered beyond any reasonable doubt, it is impos-
sible to reject the conservative’s view as unreasonable.
Although there is opacity, it is possible to identify some limits to the 
degree of opposition to abortion by the conservative, which means that 
various of the most radical religiously inspired views on abortion would 
not be permissible in Divinitia. As in the same sex marriage debate, 
liberal justice sets limits. First, concern for human life might favour 
the life of the mother when her life is in serious risk as a consequence 
of the pregnancy. Second, if it is established that the foetus suffers 
from severe malformations that make its life outside of the uterus non-
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viable, then it might be unreasonable to oppose abortion. Third, bans 
on emergency contraceptives would be ruled out. Reasonable disagree-
ment about the beginning of human life is not about whether human 
life starts right away after conception—or within the fi rst fi ve days, 
which is the usual timeframe of effi cacy of emergency contraceptives. 
Here the disagreement is about where to draw the line that indicates 
the beginning of a human life. Today, however, there is consensus that 
this does not happen right after conception—the main exception among 
the most vocal actors in this debate being the Catholic Church, which, 
as a matter of fact, did not embrace this view for the most part of its 
history–,7 but somewhere after the fi rst trimester, which explains why 
much debate about legislation on decriminalization of abortion usually 
sets a limit that avoids late abortions. This indicates that emergency 
contraceptives would not be criminalized in Divinitia.8 Against very 
strong convictions by feminists and other progressive citizens, restric-
tive legislation on abortion based on the indeterminateness about the 
beginning of human life would, in principle, include the restriction on 
abortions in cases of pregnancies resulting from sexual violence. Lib-
eral justice, however, might require exceptions to this restriction. For 
instance, in cases in which the victim of sexual violence is underage. 
Other values protecting the inviolability of human dignity might over-
ride the grounds leading to the prohibition in cases of rape, yet it might 
be the case that the reasons leading Divinitia to legitimately approve 
restrictive legislation on abortion apply to cases of rape as well.
Divinitia’s legitimacy in enacting restrictive legislation about abor-
tion, therefore, does not imply that it could be banned altogether. It is 
most likely that restrictive legislation on abortion would refer only to 
7 Dworkin argues that in public debate people do not really defi ne their position 
on abortion in relation to the question of the beginning of life. Instead, he argues, 
what concerns people the most is an idea about the sacredness of life. In the case of 
the offi cial view of the Catholic Church, which opposes any form of abortion on the 
grounds that human life starts at conception, he says that average Catholics do not 
believe in such views. Many conservative Catholics accept that abortion should be 
permitted in some cases. According to Dworkin, this shows that they consider that, 
although human life is very important (sacred), there are overriding reasons that 
lead them to accept it could be sacrifi ced. Therefore, their opposition cannot be that 
abortion should not be permitted because it involves the sacrifi ce of a human life 
(Dworkin 2011: 39).
8 According to the International Consortium for Emergency Contraception, 147 
countries have at least one emergency contraception (EC) pill brand registered, 95 
of which allow access to EC without prescription, which means free distribution 
of EC. 60 countries are registered as including EC in their essential medicine 
lists. 47 countries have no emergency contraceptive pill brands registered, which 
amounts to a complete restrictive policy. In Argentina, EC is not included in the 
Essential Medicines List (as of 2005). Access to EC requires medical prescription, 
the distribution of which is regulated within post-rape care guidelines. Source: 
International Consortium for Emergency Contraception http://www.cecinfo.org/
country-by-country-information/status-availability-database/ (last accessed Septem-
ber 3, 2018).
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cases that relate to the voluntary termination of unwanted (and, con-
troversially, probably also forced) and advanced pregnancies of adult 
women, when their lives are not under risk. If Argentina were a well 
ordered society, its current legislation on abortion would be legitimate 
in spite of its recent multitudinous demonstrations in favour of decrim-
inalization by the feminist movement (and a great number of its sup-
porters that might not describe themselves as feminists). The feminist 
movement, however, happens to be in the minority and therefore loses 
to conservatives. In the next section I investigate whether counter-ma-
joritarian political strategies—the only ones that might seem feasible 
for a political minority such as the feminist movement—are prima facie 
valid in a country like Divinitia.
2. Progressives and the status quo in Divinitia
In this section I show that minimal secularism reproduces a status 
quo bias. By this I mean that it justifi es the preservation of the status 
quo by making it harder for reformers to advance their transforma-
tive projects. I argue that if it is accepted that Divinitia can be legiti-
mately conservative, then the conservative majority is morally entitled 
to preserve the conservative tenets of the public sphere and legislation 
of its country. Although in Divinitia progressive citizens can access 
procedural democratic mechanisms to transform their society (this is 
condition d of minimal secularism), I claim that they will face a valid 
opposition grounded on the plausible view that they should respect the 
legitimate status quo of their society.
Divinitia adequately justifi es its laws, is inclusive, does not impose 
a comprehensive ethics, and observes inclusive processes of democratic 
deliberation. Importantly, progressive citizens of Divinitia will consider 
that some key aspects of the legislation of their country are profoundly 
unjust. However, given that the country is suffi ciently democratic, they 
have to accept their legitimacy and obey the law in spite of their discon-
tent. Notice that this is not a minor requirement, for it means to put up 
with legislation that they consider deeply unjust. Although progressive 
citizens can be politically engaged in order to promote social, political, 
and legislative change, I will now argue that they will have to struggle 
with a status quo that rightly justifi es itself.
Before presenting the status quo bias argument, it is important to 
address a potential objection. It could be argued that the requirement 
to put up with legislation one disagrees with is a normal feature of a 
healthy democracy. Indeed, that accepting such kind of requirements 
is what makes democracy possible. It is not my interest to contest this 
fundamental feature of democracy. I think, however, that the case at 
hand in Divinitia is different. The population I am referring to as pro-
gressives are those who do not embrace the conservative interpretation 
of the religion that inspires part of the legislation—particularly the one 
related to the family, sexuality, and reproduction—of Divinitia. The 
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requirement is therefore not only to accept the fact that it is possible 
to lose in democratic contestation, but that one is losing to a political 
view that is inspired by a conservative interpretation of the religion 
embraced by the majority. In other words, to accept that one is being 
defeated against a majority that promotes its conception of the world 
in politics. Although restrictive legislation on abortion or on same sex 
marriage is justifi ed in terms that it respects minimal secularism, it 
remains true that such legislation is approved because it does not con-
tradict the conservative interpretation of the religion embraced by the 
majority. The requirement is not therefore merely to accept democratic 
outcomes, but to accept that legislation in matters one considers ex-
tremely important is decided in relation to an interpretation of a reli-
gious doctrine one deeply disagrees with.9 To this requirement it must 
be added that progressive citizens would be required to accept that 
their political activism, although legitimate, can be defeated by the 
conservatives’ will to preserve the status quo.
The status quo bias argument can be illustrated by appealing to 
David Miller’s argument of ‘historic precedence.’ According to him, the 
territorial historic majority of a country is entitled to privilege in the 
public sphere and in the legislation to its cultural and religious iden-
tity. Discussing the referendum that proposed to ban the building of 
minarets in Switzerland, Miller defends the claim that cultural majori-
ties are entitled to ensure that the appearance of public space refl ects 
its own cultural values. As he puts it, ‘if such values refl ect a Christian 
heritage, then a Christian public sphere and legislation might remain 
hegemonic’ (Miller 2016: 448). According to him, a people that trans-
form and occupy a territory according to its needs creates a value the 
enjoinment to which it is entitled to. Part of this value is symbolic, ‘as 
the territory comes to bear the imprint of the national culture’ (Miller 
2016: 448). Members of the cultural majority understand their historic 
identity ‘partly through their direct experience of the environment they 
and their predecessors have created’ (Miller 2016: 448). The value cre-
ated by this historic process, Miller concludes, is ‘the value of national 
identity’ (Miller 2016: 448). The entitlement to preserve this histori-
cally built national identity held by the indigenous majority is what 
can justify privileging the cultural identity of the majority. Restrictions 
on cultural or religious expressions of immigrant minorities might be 
justifi ed by appeals to the entitlement of preservation and privilege of 
the majority’s cultural identity. In the case of the Swiss referendum, 
this could mean a ban on the building of Islamic minarets for the sake 
of protecting (Christian) national identity.10
9 What is at stake here is that it is religion what inspires legislation. I am 
assuming that, whatever its further meaning, in western cases of Divinitia (i.e. 
Argentina), religion concerns existential questions. This understanding of religion is 
not unusual among political philosophers (Nussbaum 2009: 168; Maclure and Taylor 
2011: 12–13).
10 It is important to annotate that Miller’s conclusion does not vindicate the 
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Minimal secularism provides a straightforward answer to Miller’s 
argument—if used to justify the Swiss ban on the building of minarets 
in Muslim mosques (Laborde 2017: 138–39). If the national identity of 
the country is defi ned in religious terms (as it is the case in the Swiss 
ban), and if religious identities are markers of vulnerability and domi-
nation (as it is also the case in the Swiss case), then privileging a Chris-
tian heritage in the name of national identity—even if this is done by 
attributing to Christianism a cultural, not religious, nature—is not 
legitimate according to the liberal standards of minimal secularism. 
The ban is illegitimate because it creates fi rst-class and second-class 
categories in the defi nition of Swiss national identity. This categoriza-
tion is generated by the facts that national identity is defi ned in terms 
of religious heritage and that grouping individuals alongside categories 
of religion is a form of reinforcing social vulnerability of some individu-
als—that is, the Muslim Swiss minority.11
It is important to notice that the objection to Miller’s argument 
shows that the ban on minarets is illegitimate in the specifi c case of 
the Swiss referendum. It does not imply that a ban of such kind will 
always be illegitimate. If context shows that conditions a, b, c and d are 
met with the ban, then minimal secularism would allow it. If conditions 
are met, minimal secularism can be compatible with bans on Muslim 
minarets. Minimal secularism also allows for a majority to privilege 
its religious or cultural heritage. This is what happens in Divinitia. 
In other words, not all privileging of a conservative, traditional, and 
religiously inspired culture is illegitimate. Similarly, not all banning 
of certain religious expressions is illegitimate—although the mere dis-
cussion on a ban of this sort might already be an indicator that, for in-
stance, religion is a marker of vulnerable social identities. In a context 
where this is the case, what can a progressive do in order to transform 
her society in such a way that it adjusts its institutions and legislation 
in accordance to what she believes is just?
It is possible to identify two alternatives open to progressive citi-
zens. The fi rst one is to engage in political activism participating in 
democratic politics. By doing so progressive citizens might eventually 
succeed in changing what they think needs to be changed. This, how-
ever, is a frustrating task, because progressives are a democratic mi-
Swiss referendum entirely. His argument is that it is permissible that a historical 
cultural majority privileges its cultural heritage by restricting cultural expressions 
of the cultures of immigrant minorities. This means that restrictions on the building 
of minarets in Switzerland are permissible. He, however, advances two criticisms 
to the Swiss referendum: its outcome should not have been entrenched in the 
constitution and it should have been held at the canton-level and not at the national 
level (Miller 2016: 452–54).
11 Religious identities are not always markers of social vulnerability. In order to 
show how this is so, Laborde refers to the cases of Senegal and Madagascar (Laborde 
2017: 142). One might wonder whether these are the two exceptions that confi rm 
the rule, thereby making minimal secularism’s criterium on vulnerable identities 
extremely demanding.
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nority which therefore might not be able to obtain enough support to 
transform legislation or institutional arrangements. Progressive citi-
zens can no doubt benefi t by the democratic fairness that is in place in 
a country like Divinitia. This ensures political rights and the possibil-
ity to actually form political movements that could aspire to democratic 
infl uence when the time comes.
A second alternative is to appeal to strategically counter-majoritar-
ian political engagement (for instance, judicial activism). This form of 
democratic activism consists of addressing the judicial branch of the 
state in order to press it to promote legislative changes. This counter 
majoritarian political engagement has proved effi cacious in legislation 
transformation in several countries; for instance, activism for decrimi-
nalization of abortion has taken this strategy in some countries where 
Catholicism is the historic majority religion.12 Although this is prob-
ably an attractive and promising strategy in terms of effi cacy, there are 
two reasons that challenge it. According to the fi rst, the conservative 
majority does not have reasons to compromise the status quo. Accord-
ing to the second, the conservative majority would be right in arguing 
that any change would be an unfair imposition upon them. Let’s con-
sider each one separately.
Conservatives in Divinitia could rightly reject progressives’ unrea-
sonable views. For instance, if they were attempting to impose athe-
ism as the state’s doctrine. This is not, however, the kind of political 
initiative I am attributing to progressives of Divinitia. I am assum-
ing that they are advancing initiatives that are legitimate according to 
the framework given by minimal secularism. These are initiatives that 
could easily be approved in Divinitia’s neighbour Secularia.13 In other 
words, they are legitimate views that, if held by a democratic majority, 
should be accepted—conservative citizens of Secularia would have a 
duty to accept them even if they are subjectively unjust. However, in 
Divinitia the majority accepts conservative legislation and therefore 
opposes to the initiatives progressive citizens try to advance. This is 
not capricious opposition grounded on political sectarianism. Conser-
vatives in Divinitia, that is the majority, (rightly) claim that conserva-
tive legislation is just and that it has been legitimately approved. They 
will rightly claim that they do not have reasons to be open to modify the 
law, because the law respects the three criteria of minimal secularism 
and they have observed democratic fairness in decision-making pro-
cesses. Although they can recognize the political reasonableness of the 
initiatives their fellow progressive citizens advance, they think of them 
12 For instance, in Colombia, where abortion is decriminalized only if pregnancy 
is the outcome of rape, the life of the new-born is at serious risk due to serious foetal 
malformations, and the life of the woman in in serious risk due to pregnancy-related 
complications.
13 Secularia is the mirror country of Divinitia, that is, it is a fi ctional legitimate 
country the legislation and public sphere of which are largely inspired by secular 
and progressive ideals (Laborde 2017: 151).
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as unjust and ultimately unacceptable for their society. The conserva-
tive majority, therefore, would be right in claiming they do not have 
any reason to incorporate the views of the progressive minority.
Additionally, conservatives of Divinitia could also complain that it 
would be unfair against them if they were forced to live under a politi-
cal regime that does not refl ect their conservative views in the public 
sphere. The conservative majority has collectively shaped the public 
sphere of its society in such a way that, fi rst, refl ects their beliefs and 
traditions and, second, succeeds in giving due respect to its minorities. 
Hence it would be unfair to suddenly change the public sphere in such 
a way that does not refl ect the beliefs and practices of the conservative 
majority and that would consider the new legislation as (subjectively) 
unjust—yet probably (objectively) legitimate. Progressive citizens of 
Divinitia are therefore fated to accept their bad luck of being in Divini-
tia and not in their preferred Secularia.
A consequence of the status quo bias is that some famous progres-
sive counter-majoritarian victories lose legitimacy precisely in virtue 
of their counter-majoritarian nature. Roe vs. Wade—the 1973 United 
States’ Supreme Court decision that recognized women’s right to decide 
to have an abortion during the fi rst trimester of pregnancy—has been 
described as having introduced the recognition of a right on a very con-
tested issue that, back in the 70s, might not have enjoyed widespread 
popular support. The decision of the Court was introduced against a 
conservative—and probably legitimate—legislation and, most likely, 
against the conservative social ethos of the population. Even if it is 
accepted that the decision of the Court advances a legitimate goal, it is 
also true that it disrupted the legitimate expectation of the conserva-
tive majority to live in a country that refl ects its social ethos.
Counter-majoritarian decisions are sometimes criticised for being 
counterproductive. While they might be well intentioned and social jus-
tice promoters, the criticism goes, their abruptness generates division 
and polarization that contributes to perpetuating confl ict rather than to 
overcoming it. In other words, in the debate about decriminalization of 
abortion in the U.S., they suggest that had the Court handled the abor-
tion issue on a step by step basis, abortion would not be such a salient 
social cleavage in contemporary politics, for it would have been already 
overcome. Following this line of thought, the adequate form of political 
activism would be to pursue gradual reforms instead of counter-majori-
tarian measures. To this prudential argument in favour of moderate 
progressive reformism and against progressive radical counter-majori-
tarian political engagement it is now possible to add a principled one, 
which defends that, in Divinitia, counter majoritarian radical political 
engagement is likely to be defeasible and legitimately so.
An alternative for the political engagement of the progressive citi-
zen of Divinitia could be political resistance. By it I mean that progres-
sives’ political engagement could not be aimed at transforming legis-
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lation but at impeding it from being approved. Given that they are a 
minority, this form of political engagement might likely be bound to 
fail. A possibility that is open to progressives in Divinitia is to function 
as watchdogs and control the legitimacy of legislation that is inspired 
by conservative interpretations of religious doctrines. This strategy is 
fairly common in the public sphere when public debates turn to abor-
tion or same sex marriage. Progressives usually claim that conserva-
tive views are religiously inspired and that the separation of church 
and state proclaimed in liberal democracies impedes them.
The interpretation that Laborde offers about public reason shows 
that progressives are wrong in thinking that no religious inspired ar-
gument can function adequately as public justifi cation. She maintains 
that public reasons should be accessible. A reason is accessible when it 
‘can be understood and assessed, but need not be endorsed according to 
common standards’ (Laborde 2017: 120). If ‘actual (not idealized) pub-
lics’ fi nd a reason accessible, then such reason is an adequate reason for 
public justifi cation. Public reason, then, provides the ‘conditions of pos-
sibility of public debate’ (Laborde 2017: 120–21) in so far as members 
of the public are able to understand each other even if they disagree in 
the substantive content each one advances. Laborde says that her the-
ory of public reason is empirical (Laborde 2017: 128), which means that 
its determination of the set of public reasons of a particular society, for 
instance Divinitia, would depend upon Divinitia’s specifi c characteris-
tics: how much of an open society Divinitia is will highly infl uence its 
set of public reasons. As she puts it ‘in pervasively religious communi-
ties, religious reasons strictu sensu […] may well provide the only cur-
rency of public reason.’ This is so because religious reasons ‘provide a 
common currency of argument and debate’ (Laborde 2017: 128).
Laborde is right in pointing out that it is highly unlikely that any 
society has such degree of homogeneity—if that is the case, it might be 
because of the ‘oppressive use of political power,’ as Rawls famously 
put it (Rawls 2005: 37). The possibility that a religious doctrine is the 
currency of public reason shows, however, that argument and public 
debate in Divinitia can be highly infl uenced by Divinitia’s shared pub-
lic culture. This culture would be inspired by a conservative interpreta-
tion of the historic religious doctrine, the key facets of which would be 
well known and understood by citizens of Divinitia. Public education 
would make sure that everybody gets some understanding of Divinitia’s 
major religious tradition; public holidays will commemorate important 
events for such religion; legislation will be inspired by religion, and the 
public sphere will give prominence to the historic religious tradition. In 
a context like this, it will be only natural that a set of religious reasons 
will be accessible to any citizen of Divinitia, progressive or not.
How does this conception of public reason impact progressives’ po-
litical resistance? Given that they have been socialized in Divinitia and 
its institutions, progressive citizens would not be able to claim that 
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they do not understand, or that they cannot engage with, justifi cations 
that appeal to conservative interpretations of religious doctrines, or, 
for that matter, that include religious references in their justifi cations. 
For them, it would not be true that they cannot access such reasons, for 
they have been raised in a culture which makes sure certain reasons 
are accessible to anyone. Progressive citizens are dissenters in their 
society in spite of the fact that conservative religiously inspired reasons 
are accessible to them.
The kind of dissent progressive citizens espouse originated in the 
fact that they remain unconvinced by the moral appeal of the reasons 
(accessible to them) that support part of the legislation of Divinitia. 
Here they face a problem, because it is their reasons which will not be 
adequately socialized in Divinitia’s public culture. The lack of social-
ization of their reasons makes them inaccessible to their fellow non-
progressive citizens, who might not be able to understand the appeal 
of feminist-inspired views on why abortion should not be criminalized; 
or why queer theory-inspired views on gender and sexuality should be 
taken into consideration the moment legislation on the institution of 
the family is approved—assuming, of course, that these are the sources 
of inspiration of the views supporting both abortion and reform in regu-
lations about the institution of the family.
I have argued that the status quo bias that Divinitia reproduces 
affects progressive citizens in four different ways. First, the likelihood 
of gaining democratic majorities is reduced and therefore their politi-
cal claims will be systematically outvoted. Second, minimal secularism 
entails that the religious and cultural majority of Divinitia can be en-
titled to preserve its national culture, which implies that they do not 
have reasons to compromise their views in order to accommodate the 
political claims of the minority of citizens that constitute the progres-
sive side. Third, from the fact that progressives are constantly outvoted 
it does not follow that conservatives have a prima facie reason to at-
tend their claims. A requirement to do so would be unfair.  Fourth, 
progressive citizens will have limited tools to enter in public delibera-
tion because their fellow citizens might not be able to understand and 
assess the reasons they would like to advance in order to support their 
political claims. Being a progressive in Divinitia entails the acceptance 
of a very limited space for hope in the possibility of political, let alone 
radical, transformation.
3. Conclusion
The purpose of this article has been to explore how is it like to be a 
progressive in Divinitia. Contrary to what it might be initially thought, 
liberal justice sets clear limits to what can be approved as legislation 
in Divinitia. Legislation about abortion might be determined in terms 
of the (religiously inspired) question about the beginning of life. How-
ever, the current offi cial doctrine of the Catholic Church—that uncon-
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ditioned protection of human life, which begins at the moment of con-
ception, should be guaranteed by the state—would not be legitimately 
approved. Legislation about same-sex marriage might also be defi ned 
in relation to the defence of traditional, religiously inspired conceptions 
of the family. However, liberal justice requires that members of LGBTI 
population enjoy of the same package of rights that any other citizen 
enjoys. Again, some of the most conservative oppositions to same sex 
marriage and relationships would not be accepted in conservative yet 
minimally liberal Divinitia. Although these limitations could be seen 
as creating a tolerable political environment for Divinitia’s progressive 
citizens, in the second part of this article I have shown that minimal 
secularism is biased towards the preservation of the status quo. I ar-
gued that the legitimacy of Divinitia means that progressive political 
advocacy loses currency and legitimacy. The political strategies open to 
progressive citizens for transforming what they think is unacceptable 
religious conservatism are likely defeated by arguments that defend 
the status quo. Against counter-majoritarian strategies, the conserva-
tive majority can reply, fi rst, that they do not have any reason to com-
promise the views that inform how legislation is shaped, and second, 
that a requirement to compromise would be unfair. Against what I 
called progressives’ political resistance in public deliberation, the con-
servative majority can reply that there is an asymmetry between the 
adequacy of the reasons they offer to progressive citizens in order to 
justify legislation that is inspired by a conservative interpretation of a 
religious doctrine, and the adequacy of the reasons progressive citizens 
offer in order to transform such legislation. In Divinitia, the former are 
likely to be accessible to all citizens, while the latter are not.
As mentioned at the beginning of the article, I have not intended 
to advance a criticism to Laborde’s conception of minimal secularism. 
I have tried to specify the consequences of accepting the legitimacy of 
a country like Divinitia. Although Divinitia would be entitled to in-
spire its legislation on a conservative interpretation of its hegemonic 
religious tradition, its institutions will be constrained by a conception 
of justice that is distinctively liberal. In this article I have made appar-
ent that the liberalism of this conception of justice is of the type that 
prefers moderation in political activism over radical political activism 
advocated by some contemporary social movements.
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